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effect if it was clear that state officials would be willing to use it. But 
any state-bankruptcy law that increased the state's restructuring 
options would enhance the state's prebankruptcy leverage. Like 
most laws, bankruptcy regulation casts a shadow.55 
This shadow effect has an important and surprising implication: 
it suggests that a bankruptcy law could prove beneficial even if it is 
never used. In other contexts, disuse of a law is often cited as grounds 
that the law is misguided or inappropriate.56 Perhaps based on this 
intuition, critics of Chapter 9, the closest analogue to state 
bankruptcy, sometimes point to its sparing use, and the fact that it 
has rarely been invoked by a city of any size, as evidence that it is 
ineffectuaJ.'? Although Chapter 9 may have other shortcomings,58 the 
dearth of major cases is not by itself evidence that the legislation has 
failed. Quite to the contrary, the shadow benefit may be enormous. 
Indeed, if the bankruptcy framework enabled even a few states to 
address debt overhang without actually going through a bankruptcy 
process, we would have ample justification for a state-bankruptcy 
law. 
B. Curbing Political Agency Costs 
Nearly every state fiscal crisis can be traced, at least in part, to 
the agency costs of political decision makers- that is, conflicts of 
interest between the incentives of the decision makers and the 
constituencies that they ostensibly represent.59 Most recently, two 
related distortions have occupied much of the spotlight. The first is 
lawmakers' temptation to finance current expenditures by 
borrowing, which enables them to enjoy the benefits of spending 
55 The "shadow" metaphor was coined in Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950,997 (1979). 
56 This intuition even has a name and doctrine: desuetude. See, for example, William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505, 591-94 (2001) 
(describing desuetude and calling for its expanded use in criminal law). 
57 See, for example, Orner Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in 
Search of a Problem, 27 Yale J Reg 351, 359 (2010) ("The chapter is in fact seldom used, and it 
has almost never been used by a large and important city."). 
58 The most obvious is the phalanx of barriers that must be surmounted before Chapter 9 
can be invoked. See, for example, Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities 
Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425, 455-61 
(1993) (describing and criticizing entry requirements such as prebankruptcy negotiation with 
creditors and demonstration of insolvency). 
59 Agency cost terminology originated in the economic analysis of corporate governance 
as an account of the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. See 
Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 303, 308-09 (1976). 
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while shuffling the costs off to others.;;o The second arises from 
lawmakers' dependence on the votes of the public employees whose 
pensions they establish through ostensibly arm's length bargaining 
with employee representatives.6' Although it would not eliminate 
these distortions, a state-bankruptcy framework would curb both. 
Start with lawmakers' temptation to fund current spending with 
borrowed funds. The price of state bonds is buoyed-and thus the 
cost of borrowing for the state is reduced-by an implicit promise 
that bondholders will be bailed out if a state falls into financial 
distress.62 By decreasing the cost of borrowing, this subsidy increases 
the allure of credit, thus exacerbating the temptation to use bond 
financing. By providing a mechanism for restructuring a state's bond 
obligations in the event of a crisis, bankruptcy would trim this 
subsidy. If bankruptcy reduced the pressure for a federal bailout, as 
it likely would,6' it would assure that the price of bonds more 
accurately reflected their true social cost, and it would give 
bondholders an incentive to monitor the state's financial condition. 
Lawmakers would still be tempted to borrow funds for current 
spending, but they (and thus the state) would pay a higher price for 
doing so. 
The second distortion-states' pension obligations-is the single 
greatest threat to states' fiscal stability. Many states have made 
implausibly generous pension commitments to their employees, and 
state pension funds are radically underfunded-by roughly $3 
trillion, according to some recent estimates. 64 Political agency costs 
are a prominent cause of the pension crisis. The lawmakers who 
60 s'ee Gillette, 86 Denver U L Rev at 1256 (cited in note 29) (describing the "incentive 
to utilize too much debt and to impose a temporal externality on future residents"). 
61 See, for example, Richard Epstein, The Wisconsin Shoot Out on Public Unions, 
Defining Ideas (Hoover Institution Feb 22, 2011), online at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications!defining-ideasfarticle/67771 (visited Nov 25, 2011). 
61 This is similar to the subsidy that bondholders of Citigroup and Bank of America 
enjoyed in 2008, due to the widespread (correct, as it turned out) assumption the institutions 
would be protected from default. See Dean Baker and Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too 
Big to Fail" Big Bank Subsidy, Issue Brief 2 (Center for Economic and Policy Research Sept 
2009). 
63 Oay Gillette has argued that the existence of a bankruptcy law could actually be used 
as a leverage by the state to secure a bailout. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, 
Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U Chi L Rev 281, 302-08 (2011) 
(noting that contagion effects of state defaults would lead federal government to favor bailouts 
over bankruptcy). Although Gillette's point about the strategic possibilities is an important 
one, a state's ability to threaten to simply default already gives the state considerable leverage. 
Bankruptcy seems likely to decrease pressure for a bailout overall, as discussed later in this 
Article. 
64 The high-end $3 trillion estimate comes from Robert Novy-Max and Joshua D. Rauh, 
The Liabilities and Risks of State-Sponsored Pension Plans, 23 J Econ Persp 191, 204 (2009). 












































